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CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
One objection to state or municipal "incorporation by reference" of
federal statutes or regulations has already been considered: that it con-
stitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Another
objection is based on those state constitutional provisions which pre-
scribe the form in which legislation is to be enacted. Thus, approxi-
mately two-thirds of the states have constitutional provisions to the
general effect that no law shall be revived, revised, or amended by refer-
ence to its title only-it being required that so much as is revived, re-
vised or amended be copied into the law being enacted. However, it
is clear that a state adoptive law is neither "reviving," "revising," or
"amending" the federal law which it adopts. Hence, this constitutional
provision is usually held not to be a barrier to state laws incorporating
other state or federal laws.'
In the constitutions of nine states there is added to the phrase "that
no act may be revived, revised, or amended by reference to its title
only," the words "or the provisions thereof extended or conferred." 2
This, too, is not apt language to cover the adoption situation, and no
difficulty seems to have been encountered in these states'--with slight
exception. A New Mexico court, reversing itself after rehearing, de-
clared that the addition of the word "extended" was sufficient to render
invalid an attempted state adoption of the provisions of the National
* The first part of this article appeared in 57 YALE L. 3. 1 (1947).
f Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law School; formerly Solicitor, Liti-
gation Division, Enforcement Department, OPA. The author has felt free to draw on
the briefs he prepared for the Price Administrator on some of the matters discussed
herein.
1. E.g., State Docks Commission v. State, 227 Ala. 521, 150 So. 345 (1933);
In re Altman, 26 Ariz. 635, 229 Pac. 388 (1924); Central of Georgia R. R. Co. v.
State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S.E. 531 (1898); Boise City v. Baxter, 41 Idaho 363, 233
Pac. 1029 (1915); Lyman v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 223, 242 S.W. 21 (1922); Spahn
v. Stewart, 26S Ky. 97, 103 S.,.2d 651 (1937); State v. Dehart, 109 La. 570, 574,
33 So. 605, 606 (1903) ; State v. Peyton, 234 Mo. 517, 523, 137 S.W. 979, 930 (1911);
State ex rel. Berthot v. High School District, 102 Mont. 356, 58 P.2d 264 (1936) ; Dept.
of Banking v. Foe, 136 Neb. 422, 286 N.W. 264 (1939) ; Town of Haskell v. Edmonds,
90 Okla. 44, 215 Pac. 629 (1923) ; Hunt v. Tausick, 64 Wash. 69, 116 Pac. 651 (1911).
But see Carroll v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 28 Idaho 466, 154 Pac. 935 (1916) ; Ex
parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, 216 Pac. 509 (1923).
2. Ala., Ark., Colo., Ky., Mont., N.M., Okla., Pa., Wyo.
3. See the Alabama, Kentucky and Oklahoma cases in note 1, supra.
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Prohibition Act. 4 In Pennsylvania, by contrast, an unfavorable dictum
with respect to adoption of a definition in the federal food and drug
law in a lower court case5 has probably been dissipated.'
The only remaining constitutional provisions which seem to present
any problem are those in Louisiana, North Dakota, New Jersey and
New York. The Louisiana Constitution provides that the legislature
shall never adopt "any system or code of laws by general reference to
such system or code of laws; but in all cases shall recite at length the
several provisions of the laws it may enact." 7 The North Dakota Con-
stitution states: "No bill shall be revised or amended, nor the provi-
sions thereof extended or incorporated in any other bill by reference
to its title only. .. ." 8 There are apparently no cases directly in point
in either of these states, though some Louisiana decisions9 as well as
some North Dakota decisions 0 indicate a rather strict construction.
The New York Constitution," with which the New Jersey Constitu-
tion is virtually identical, 12 is the strictest of all: "No act shall be passed
which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be
made or deemed a part of said act, or which shall enact that any exist-
ing law, or part thereof, shall be applicable except by inserting it in such
act." A New Jersey lower court 3 and the New York Court of Appeals
in the Darweger case14 felt that this provision prevented incorporation
of federal NRA codes, but other New Jersey cases' 5 have permitted a
4. State v. Armstrong, 31 N.Mex. 220, 243 Pac. 333 (1924).
5. Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 39 Pa. Super. 338 (1909).
6. Commonwealth v. Alderman, 275 Pa. 483, 119 Ati. 551 (1924).
7. LA. CoNsT. Art. 3, § 18.
8. N.D. CONST. Art. 2, § 64.
9. State v. Dehart, 109 La. 570, 33 So. 605, 607 (1903) ; Rathborne v. Coll. of Int.
Rev., 196 La. 795, 200 So. 149, 154 (1941) ; cf. State v. Cleary, 152 La. 265, 92 So. 892
(1922).
10. State ex rel. Gammons v. Shafer, 63 N.D. 128, 246 N.W. 874 (1933) ; Dept. of
State Highways v. Baker, 69 N.D. 702, 290 N.W. 257 (1940).
11. N.Y. CONST. Art. 3, §16.
12. N.J. CoNsT. Art. 4, § 7.
13. Wilentz v. Sears Roebuck, 12 N.J. Misc. 531, 17 At. 903 (Ch. 1934). There
was an analogous lower court ruling with respect to incorporation of federal air regula-
tions, New Jersey v. Larson, 10 N.J. Misc. 384 (Co. Ct. of Oyer & Ter. 1932). Both
cases also frowned on the delegation involved.
14. Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935). Some previous courts in
New York had agreed. Cline v. Consumers' Cooperative, 152 Misc. 653, 274 N.Y. Supp. 362
(1934) ; De Agostina v. Parkshire Ridge Amusements, 155 Misc. 518, 278 N.Y. Supp. 622
(1935). At least one had held otherwise. Spaulding v. Kaminski, 153 Misc. 678, 276
N.Y. Supp. 663 (1934) (codes are not "laws").
15. Texas Co. v. Dickinson, 79 N.J.L. 292, 75 Atl. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (reciprocal
tax statute) ; Hutches v. Borough of Hohokus, 82 N.J.L. 140, 81 Atl. 658 (Sup. Ct. 1911)
(incorporating procedural provisions of existing state statutes); State v. Masnik, 123
N.J.L. 335, 8 A.2d 701, aff'd, 125 N.J.L. 34, 12 A.2d 871 (1940) (incorporating common-
law of incest); Scharf v. Reiser, 91 Atl. 642 (N.J. Sup. 1914) (defining a phrase by
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variety of incorporations; and People v. Mfailman0 and other New York
cases were able to cite respectable New York predecents for the incor-
poration by reference of OPA requirements. 17 Whether on the one hand
the Mailman decision is a result of the special nature of the Emergency
Price Control Act or special feelings about the war, or on the other
hand, the Darweger case was the result of the special nature of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act and strong feelings felt about that stat-
ute, is not clear. At any rate, in New York as well as in New Jersey,
there are usable precedents that may result in sustaining future in-
stances of incorporation of federal requirements. It should be noted,
finally, that the constitutional limitations on incorporation by refer-
ence would not generally be regarded as applicable to municipal ordi-
nances.18
OCCUPATION OF THE FIELD: CONFLICT OR INCONSISTENCY
One of the major reasons for the Ohio Supreme Court's invalidation
of the Cleveland ordinance, adopting and enforcing OPA regulations,
was its belief that the Emergency Price Control Act occupied the field
"upon a subject matter which is national in character and can be gov-
erned only by a uniform system, to wit, nation-wide rationing and
reference to another New Jersey statute) ; Bd. of Education of Ne~wark v. Civil Service
Commission of N. J., 98 N.J.L. 417, 119 At. 875 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (extending provisions of
the state civil-service law to school-districts).
16. 293 N.Y. 887, 59 N.E.2d 790 (1944), affirming 182 Misc. 870, 49 N.Y.S2d 733
(N.Y. City Cts. 1944).
17. The lower court in the failman case, aff'd wlithout opinion, stressed the factor
we have discussed previously in connection with delegation, namely that the federal re-
quirements were already applicable to intrastate commerce in New York state (which
had not been true in the Darweger case) ; the state law concerned the "mere enforcemcnt
of existing federal laws already applicable." But, also cited was a case in which this
factor was not present: Transit Commission v. Long Island ILL, 248 App. Div. 749, 228
N.Y. Supp. 938 (1936), aff'd 272 N.Y. 27 (1936) (certain intrastate rates made to vary
with interstate rates controlled by I.C.C.). The Transit case had cited Watinson Y. Hotel
Pennsylvania, 195 App. Div. 624, 187 N.Y. Supp. 278 (1921), af'd, 231 N.Y. 562, 132 N.E.
889 (1921) (incorporating federal statutory conditions for grants-in-aid). Other New
York cases upholding the incorporation of OPA regulations were Butter & Egg Mer-
chants Ass'n v. LaGuardia, 181 Misc. 889, 47 N.Y.S2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Mosner .
Haddock, 181 Misc. 486, 46 N.Y.S2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 752, 48
N.Y.S.2d 802 (1944); People v. Brongofsky, 181 Misc. 78, 50 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y. City
Cts. 1943).
18. Since the constitutional provision that a "law" should contain one subject, ex-
pressed in its title, is generally held to apply only to state law (37 Amr. JM. § 146) and
since this occurs in the same sentence or section as the provision on amending, etc. by
reference to title, the same rule should apply. It was specifically so held in Baumgartner
v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575, 50 Am. Rep. 830 (1884); City of Philadelphia v. Houlihan, 37
Pa. D.&C. 29 (1940). Many cases have upheld reference ordinances without referring to
the constitutional provision. See, e.g., Sloss-Sheffleld Steel Co. v. Smith, 175 Ala. 260,
57 So. 29 (1911); Casteel v. City of Decatur, 215 Ala. 4, 109 So. 571 (1926) ; Richards
v. Town of Magnolia, 100 Miss. 249, 56 So. 386 (1911).
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price control of commodities and rents. Nowhere in the Act has Con-
gress granted its express consent to the exercise of concurrent power
by the states." 19 The Michigan Supreme Court, on the other hand,
held that the Detroit OPA ordinance was not an "unconstitutional
encroachment upon the war powers of the Congress", 20 citing the state
sedition acts during World War I, which had been upheld,2 1 and Sec-
tion 201(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, which authorized the
Price Administrator to "utilize the services of Federal, State and local
agencies .... ," 22 So, too, the lower court in the Mailman case, af-
firmed without opinion by the New York Court of Appeals, held that
New York State had power to adopt its anti-inflationary measures
assisting the national government in time of war, since they did not
conflict with those of the national government; 23 and the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court ruled similarly with respect to the Puerto Rico law.
24
Whether, in the case of future examples of adoptive legislation, the
"occupation of the field" obstacle will be interposed is not easily an-
swered. Considerable confusion has resulted from the application of
this doctrine, and it has often been said that no formula exists for its
ready application. 21 Sometimes~state requirements going beyond those
which Congress has provided in a particular field will be permitted,20
yet sometimes completely identical or harmonious regulation will not
be, on the theory that "when Congress has taken the particular sub-
ject matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition." 1 Sig-
nificance may be attached to a provision by Congress merely authoriz-
ing federal cooperation with state and local bodies.2 1 A federal adminis-
19. City of 'Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 153, 60 N.E.2d 919, 923 (1945).
20. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 328, 17 N.W.2d 193, 201 (1945).
21. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166
N.W. 181 (1918).
22. 56 STAT. 29, 50 U.S.C. App. § 921 (1942).
23. People v. Mailman, 182 Misc. 870, 878, 49 N.Y.S.2d 733, 739 (N.Y. City Cts.
1944).
24. Irizarry v. District Court of Ponce, 2 PIKE AND FiscHER 2196, 2197-8 (Sup.
Ct, Puerto Rico, 1944). The court also referred to Puerto Rico v. Shell, 302 U.S. 253
(1937) which had sustained a Puerto Rico anti-trust statute making prohibitions sub-
stantially similar to those of the federal anti-trust law which was also applicable in
Puerto Rico.
25. See Welch v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 84 (1939).
26. See, e.g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S.
1 (1937); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598
(1940); Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188 (1933).
27. Charleston & W. C. Ry. v. Varnville Furn. Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915). See
Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 448 (1915); Missouri-
Pac. R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 345-6 (1927).
28. In Rice v. Bd. of Trade of Chicago, 67 Sup. Ct. 1160, 1164 (1947), the Court thus
referred to § 12 of the Commodity Exchange Act (49 STAT. 1491 (1936), 7 U.S.C. § 1
(1940) et seq.) : "Moreover the provision in Sec. 12 of the Act that the Secretary 'may co-
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trative construction of the federal statute so as to permit state action
may~l or may not"0 have weight in determining Congressional intention.
operate with any department or agency of the Government, any State... or political sub-
division thereof' supports the inference that Congress did not design a regulatory system
which excluded state regulation not in conflict with the federal requirements."
As previously referred to, the Michigan Supreme Court in upholding the Detroit
OPA ordinance cited § 201 (a) of the Emergency Price Control Act authorizing the Price
Administrator to utilize the services of federal, state and local agencies. People v. Sell,
310 Mich. 305, 328, 17 N.W.2d 193, 201 (1945).
29. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 351 (1933): "Much veight is to be given to
the practical interpretation of the Act by the Federal Department through its acqui-
escence in the enforcement of state measures to suppress Bang's disease."
Although the courts in the OPA cases did not refer to this aspect of the problem,
they were informed in the Administrator's brief that the Administrator had actively en-
couraged and welcomed state and local assistance; that there was testimony in 1944 before
three separate Congressional committees revealing the extent and importance of such
assistance (Mayor LaGuardia's testimony in Hearings before the Senate Committee or
Banking and Currency on S. 1764, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. 657-9 (1944); testimony of
Deputy Administrator for Enforcement Emerson in 1 Hearings before the House Com-
imittee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 4376, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. 155 (1944) ; testi-
mony of Administrator Bowles in Hearings before the subconmnittee of the House Com-
inittee on Appropriations on; Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1944, 78th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 294 (1944) ; and that the Act wvas thereafter reenacted without change in this
respect. It is interesting to compare these facts with the critical comment made on the
floor of the House on November 5, 1943, principally by Rep. Dirksen regarding the OPA
"model ordinance" which had just come to his attention (89 CONG. RmT. 9254-5 (1943)).
In this connection, also, some explanation may be necessary of Section 5 of the Price
Control Extension Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 670-3, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 902 (1946) : "While
maximum rents are in effect under this Act with respect to housing accommodations in
any defense-rental area, such housing accommodations shall not be subject to rent con-
trol by any State or local government." This provision was the reaction to an amend-
ment which passed the Senate on July 11, 1946 (92 CoNG. Rsc 8757 (1946)). The
amendment had been offered in the interim period following the temporary suspension of
rent control on June 30, 1946 (following a Presidential veto) and wvas suggested by the
fact that some states and municipalities had jumped into the breach by enactment of their
own rent controls. The amendment was designed to continue such local controls in place
of the federal controls to be reenacted in the extension bills, and to permit future
local controls to be enacted to take the place of the federal controls. The Con-
ference Committee, however, rejected the amendment and reasserted the previous para-
mount control by the federal government in the above-quoted language of Section 5.
This was not of course, intended to interfere with the ordinances and state laws which
had been passed to supplement and assist the federal statute and regulations by adopting
their identical provisions and providing additional means of enforcement. It was de-
signed to avoid conflict between the federal regulations and the new local regulations
enacted after June 30, 1946.
30. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Board, 67 Sup. Ct. 1026
(1947), the N.Y. State Labor Relations Act patterned after the National Labor Relations
Act, was invalidated pro tant6 in spite of evidence of the administrative understanding
and division of labor between federal and state boards. (The Court stressed that the state
policy had conflicted with the federal board's policy of refusal to designate foremen as
bargaining units, though the federal policy was thereafter changed; the state and national
boards had "wide discretion," governed by "somewhat different standards"; and conflict
could easily arise in the future.)
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Of course, a specific Congressional provision to the effect that there is
no intent to prevent state measures of a specified nature is the best
solvent of the difficulty, and this has sometimes been done by Con-
gress.
3 1
A reading of the numerous cases on "occupation of the field" will
reveal the persistent judicial concern over avoidance of actual or po-
tential conflict or inconsistency with the federal law. That being the
chief concern, it is understandable that the "occupation of the field"
objection has rarely been effective in the "adoption" situations- where
federal and state requirements are identical. But, even here, as has
been indicated, the court may act on the theory that "coincidence is
as ineffective as opposition," as did the Ohio court in the Piskura case.
The issue of conflict or inconsistency is particularly pertinent once
it is decided that there has been no occupation of the field by Congress.
State legislation will then be permitted in the absence of conflict or in-
consistency. This is the situation which came up in People v. Lewis,1
2
though on the state-city rather than federal-state level. At the time
this case was before the Court of Appeals, the Mailman case had al-
ready been decided, hence it was already the law in New York that
state adoption and enforcement of federal OPA regulations did not
run afoul of the "occupation of the field" obstacle; and the fact that
the penalties attaching to state violations differed from those attach-
ing to federal violations had not been regarded (though this was not
raised or discussed) as creating an improper conflict or inconsistency.
It was therefore not too difficult to persuade the court that the New
York City ordinance involved in the Lewis case did not create the al-
leged conflict or inconsistency with the state law, in spite of some dif-
ferences from the state law-principally the presence of heavier penal-
ties in the ordinance. 3 The further question of whether the ordinance,
31. Securities Act of 1933 § 18, 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1940); Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28, 48 STAT. 903 (1924), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1940) ; U.S.
Warehouse Act § 29, before and after amendment 39 STAT. 490 (1916), 46 STrAT. 1465
(1931), 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1940). See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1146
(1947), involving the latter provision.
32. 295 N.Y. 42, 64 N.E.2d 702 (1945).
33. That such a difference in penalties does not invalidate the ordinance is the usual
rule. See Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368, 14 S.W. 38.(1890); Rossberg v. State, 111
Md. 394, 74 Atl. 581 (1909); City of Owosso v. Michigan Central R.R., 183 Mich. 688,
150 N.W. 323 (1915); Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519
(1923) ; 3 McQumLLIN, LAW OF MuNxiciAL CoaPORATIONS § 924 (2d ed. 1943) ; 37 AM.
JuL §§ 165-6 (although constitutional provisions, state statutes, or common law may in-
validate such a difference in penalties or may even prevent an ordinance from making the
same prohibition with the same penalty. See 3 McQumLIN, supra, §§ 925-32). So, too,
under the concurrent power granted by the 18th Amendment it was held that state and
federal prohibition laws "may vary in many particulars, including the penalties prescribed,
but this is an inseparable incident of independent legislative action in distinct jurisdic-
tions." United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381 (1922) ; McCormack & Co. v. Brown,
286 U.S. 131, 144 (1932).
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if construed to omit a wilfulness standard, was inconsistent with the
state law if construed to contain such a standard, was side-stepped by
the court34 though there is authority that such a difference betveen
state and federal law, 35 or between city and state law is not a fatal
conflict or inconsistency.
A problem in the scope of the incorporation of the federal provisions,
containing the seeds of substantial conflict between the federal and
state statutes, was suggested by, although not squarely raised in Butter
& Egg Merckants Association v. La GuardiaY There the plaintiff, an-
ticipating prosecutions under the New York State War Emergency Act
and War Council resolution, sought an injunction to restrain enforce-
ment of certain OPA food regulations, which he attacked as invalid.
Since Section 204(d) of the Emergency Price Control Act gave exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the Emergency Court of Appeals to consider validity
of regulations, and prohibited any injunctive relief against the Act or
regulations issued pursuant thereto, the court rightly ruled it had no
jurisdiction. A more interesting question would have been presented
if the complaint was directed not against the federal requirements but
against the state requirements. If the complaint charged that the state
act and War Council resolution thereunder were violative of due proc-
ess under the state constitution and the 14th Amendment, because
of the arbitrariness of the requirements which had been incorporated
by them from the federal regulations, it would have been at least ques-
34. From the opinion it appears that the Court misunderstood the theory of the
prosecution to be that both the state law and city ordinance required wilfulness, hence
there was no conflict. The theory of the defense was that only the state lay required
wilfulness. The Court ruled that though the "local law is not in terms limited to wilful
violations" the evidence showed vilfulness and the conviction was for a wilful violation,
hence defendant was in no position to challenge validity of the ordinance for lack of a
wilfulness requirement. It also observed, "the omission of the word 'wilfully' is of no
legal significance and does not render the local law invalid. See People v. Sampsell, 248
N.Y. 157 where we dealt with a similar difference between a State and a local law."
People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 50, 64 N.E.2d 702, 704 (1945). The Court may have meant
that the wilfulness requirement was to be read into the ordinance.
35. In Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 340-1 (1920) a Minnesota anti-sedition
law was upheld which punished the same acts as those punishable under the federal anti-
sedition law but omitted the federal requirement of criminal intent.
36. In People v. Steinhardt, 215 App. Div. 724, 213 N.Y. Supp. 882 (2d Dep't 1925),
aff'd, 245 N.Y. 553, 157 N.E. 854 (1927) it appeared that § 2040 of the state penal law made
a misdemeanor of the wilful violation of a requirement that adequate heat be furnished
to buildings, whereas no wilfulness was required under a similar provision of § 225 of the
Sanitary Code of New York City. The record on appeal shows that defendant vigorously
urged the invalidity of the Sanitary Code provision as "inconsistent" with the state law.
The conviction was affirmed without opinion by both the Appellate Division and the
Court of Appeals. Cf. Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 74 AtI. 581 (1909) where a nar-
cotics ordinance was upheld which prohibited mere possession as well as distribution,
and the State law prohibited only the latter.
37. 181 Misc. 889, 47 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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tionable whether the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the Price Con-
trol Act were applicable. 8 However, in view of the disruptive effect
on the federal enforcement plan that might stem from opening up the
possibility of court judgments in local enforcement proceedings indi-
rectly declaring the federal regulations invalid, it may well be con-
tended that Congress would not have acquiesced in local legislation
having such an anomalous result, nor could the local legislature have
had such a result in mind. In this view the local legislation would be
viewed as having incorporated sub silentio, the exclusive-jurisdiction
restrictions forming the very heart of the Act with which the local legis-
lature had sought to cooperate.39
It is apparent, even from a cursory review of the cases, that the
closest interweaving of primary and adoptive legislation leaves room
for vexing interstitial questions. On the whole, however, objections
to adoptive laws on the grounds of occupation of the field or of conflict
or inconsistency, are not likely to be a serious threat to their validity.
The threat would be considerably reduced of course where the substan-
tive provisions are identical and Congress has given some indication
of its desire for cooperation from local sovereignties.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS
The assertion that the Detroit OPA ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague and indefinite in punishing violations of changing federal regu-
lations not set forth in the ordinance, was the basis of the dissenting
opinion in People v. Sell4 0 However, the fact that administrative regu-
lations are not set forth in a statute of the same sovereignty and change
from time to time, clearly does not make a statute invalidly indefinite;
and there is no reason to regard the uncertainty as substantially in-
creased by, the fact that the regulations are formulated by another
sovereignty. In fact, the Alabama Supreme Court has praised for its
introducing a greater element of' certainty into the public's obligations,
an ordinance providing that any person committing "an offense pro-
hibited by the laws of the state of Alabama" was guilty of a misde-
meanor against the city4 -- though this type of ordinance is not always
38. Cf. Federated Meat Corp. v. Fleming, 159 F.2d 725 (E.C.A. 1947).
39. However, the "stay" procedure enacted by Congress in 1944 to prevent certain
"good faith" defendants from being penalized for alleged violations while diligently pur-
suing or while seeking to pursue, their administrative remedy under the Act (see United
States v. Fish, 154 F.2d 798, 800 (C.C.A. 2d 1946), cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 1377 (1946))
would not be applicable to defendants under the local legislation, since the "stay" pro-
cedure could be invoked only by those who were sued under § 205 of the federal Act or
§37 of the Criminal Code, 56 STAT. 31 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Air. §924(e)
(Supp. 1946).
40. 310 Mich. 305, 328, 17 N.W.2d 193, 201 (1945).
41. "Such a general or reference ordinance serves two purposes: One of convenience,
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held valid. 42 Some of the cases previously referred to as upholding
laws against the delegation objection also uphold them against the
vagueness objection.43 An important point to remember in this connec-
tion is that an enactment otherwise invalid for vagueness may be saved
by the presence of a wilfulness requirement; 44 for a conviction there-
under cannot be had unless defendant has been found to have knowm
its meaning. 4
5
the avoidance of expense in enacting and promulgating a volume of penal ordinances in
the same terms as well-known public statutes; the other is the element of certainty.
"The meaning of the brief ordinance is not in doubt. The citizen, not required to be
advised upon two parallel codes of laws, can look to one, of which he is already required
to take notice, and whose construction has often been well settled, to keep himself within
the law of both jurisdictions." Casteel v. City of Decatur, 215 Ala. 4, 109 So. 571, 572
(1926).
42. See, e.g., the recent decision in Town of Conway v. Lee, 209 S.C. 292, 33 S.E.2d
914 (1946).
43. See, e.g., Johnson v. Elliott, 168 S.W. 968 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Brown v.
State, 323 Mo. 138, 19 S.V.2d 12 (1929); Wright v. Worth, 83 Fla. 204, 91 So. 87
(1922) ; People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.V.2d 193 (1945).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942) ; Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945).
45. Various issues deserving of brief mention have come up under the Nev. York
OPA adoption legislation. One was responsibility of an individual employer for viola-
tions by his salesmen-an issue which is of course not pechliar to this tyvpe of legislation.
The only violations shown were those of defendant's salesmen. There 'was evidence that
defendant knew of past violations by his salesmen, and had instructed them to make up
certain losses. The complaint charged that he "unlawfully" sold over ceiling (rather
than "wilfully," as defendant claimed was necessitated by the alleged wilfulness require-
ment of the state law). Defendant was fined $175 and given a suspended sentence of 10
days. The Court of Special Sessions, Appellate Term, First Dept. affirmed on the
ground that the evidence warranted the Magistrate in finding wilful violations by de-
fendant. The Court of Appeals similarly affirmed without opinion, with a brief dissenting
observation that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. People v. Rosen-
garten, 296 N.Y. 903, 72 N.E.2d 623 (1947).
Another issue not closely related to the adoption problem was that of Magistrate
Court jurisdiction over the cases under the New York legislation. People cx rel. Gross
v. Adams, 296 N.Y. 604, 68 N.E.2d 883 (1946) affirmed without opinion the ruling of the
court below, 270 App. Div. 607, 62 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1st Dep't 1946) on the rather novel
point that for offenses below the grade of misdemeanor there is a residual jurisdiction in
the Magistrates court, where no statute specifically places the jurisdiction over the
particular offense in any court. Unlike the state law, the city ordinance did not designate
the Magistrate's court as having jurisdiction. The decision was extremely important for
effective enforcement of the ordinance, in view of the summary procedure of the Magis-
trate's court.
A question which may recur, however, under adoption legislation was involved in
Mfatter of Harris Motors, 296 N.Y. 242, 72 N.E2d 305 (1946), i.e., the necessity of re-
enactment of the adoptive law where there has been a hiatus or change in federal con-
trols. The ordinance had provided that it was to remain in effect as long as the federal
acts under authority of which the price and rationing regulations were issued should re-
main in effect. The Emergency Price Control Act expired June 30, 1946, and was not
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ADOPTIVE LEGISLATION AS AN EXERCISE OF LOCAL POLICE POWER
Adoptive statutes and ordinances, like all other expressions of the
legislative will, must ultimately meet the legal challenges directed
against their substantive validity. Issues of delegation, incorporation
by reference, and the like, are in a sense ritualistic-they are concerned
with the methods by which power is exercised. These issues do not
front upon the final question of whether, granted validity of method,
states and municipalities have the underlying power they profess to
exercise over people's conduct. The answers to this question do not
depend upon the form in which legislation is cast, but upon the subject
matter over which power is asserted and the basic fairness of the at-
tempted regulation. The substantive validity of the adoptive legisla-
tion which lent local impetus to the enforcement of OPA is deserving
of special comment, for under this legislation states and cities ex-
tended the traditional limits of local government by exercising unprec-
edented control over vast areas of the American economy. Precedent-
wise, much significance may attach to the judicial willingness to cloak
this adoptive legislation in the protective folds of the police power.
Curiously enough, a threshold question is whether the police power
is involved at all. The Ohio Supreme Court in City of Cleveland v. Pis-
kura thought it was not. The basis of the court's conclusion is none too
clear, but it might be spelled out as follows: the Cleveland ordinance"
revived until July 25, 1946. 'The alleged violation of the ordinance occurred August 5,
1946. The defendant claimed the ordinance was ineffective for lack of reenactment after
the expiration of federal controls; and attacked the trial proceedings by writ of pro-
hibition. The writ was denied on the merits by Justice Botein, who was affirmed without
opinion by the Appellate Division, First Dept., which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that prohibition was the wrong remedy. On the merits defendant
seems to have been quite wrong. Insofar as the defendant was arguing that the local law
could not constitutionally have had reference to future amendments or future substitute
statutes, he was raising the delegation objection which had been rejected in People v.
Mailman, supra p. 203. Insofar as he war arguing on the basis of the intent of the local
law, the argument was belied by the stated purpose of the law to "cooperate with the
price, rationing and rent control programs of the . . . United States . . ." and by the
provision prohibiting charging more than the maximum price which "has been or may
hereafter be prescribed by. any regulation . . . issued by the office of price administra-
tion . . ." There was, moreover, a special factor in this case. Even if the local law had
specified that its effectiveness be dependent on an unbroken effectiveness of the federal
act, this would not have impaired the effectiveness of the local law, in view of § 18 of
the federal extension law, under which there was, in legal contemplation, an unbroken
effectiveness of the federal controls: The 1946 Act was to take effect, with some excep-
tions, "as of June 30, 1946."
46. "Sec. 2207-1. Whoever, in the course of trade or business or for profit sells or in
any other way transfers a commodity, rationed by any order or regulation of the United
States of America, or any agency thereof, without taking in exchange for such com-
modity the coupons, stamps, certificates, ration checks or other ration documents, if any,
required by the order or regulation in effect at the time of the sale or transfer, shall be
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did "nothing more than provide a penalty for the violation of the fed-
eral act within the confines of the city of Cleveland"; 1 Congress had
"occupied the field" by the federal Emergency Price Control Act and
determined that only federal courts should have jurisdiction of criminal
proceedings under the Act; hence, the municipal penalty and municipal
jurisdiction were improper, and "no question of miunicipal home rile is
in anywise involved." 41
The court did not say that, in view of the decision on occupation
of the field, the question of municipal home rule is not reached; it said
that the question is in no way involved. Presumably this is because
the court regarded the ordinance as simply an attempt to write another
sanction and another jurisdictional provision into a federal statute.
But, it seems clear that municipal penalties are, and can only be, im-
posed for violation of municipal prohibitions. And, no penalty may
be imposed for the violation of a prohibition which there is no power to
enact. In other words, the ordinance could not "provide a penalty for
the violation of the federal Act" without adopting the federal require-
ments as municipal requirements, applicable within the municipalityl
-an adoption which required an exertion of its police power.," (And
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not
more than five hundred ($500.00) dollars or imprisoned in the workhouse for not more
than (60) days or both for such offense.
"Sec. 2207-2. Whoever sells a commodity which is the subject of a ceiling price fixed
by or under the authority of the United States of America at a price in excess of such ceiling
price so established, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall
be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred ($500.00) dollars or imprisonment
in the workhouse for not more than sixty (60) days or both for each offense.
"Sec. 2207-3. Independent of the penalty prescribed for the violations of Section
2207-1 and 2207-2, and in addition thereto, any person who is found guilty of a violation
of any of the provisions of Sections 2207-1 or 2207-2 may, upon the recommendation of
the commission of markets, weights and measures, be deprived of any license issued to
such person by the city of Cleveland, and any person who is found guilty of a second or
subsequent violation of any of said provisions shall forthwith be deprived of any license
issued to such person by the city of Cleveland; provided, further, that any license re-
voked for such second or subsequent offense shall not be reissued during the period of
the present war emergency and six months thereafter to such person or to any other per-
son, firm, or corporation, in his behalf, or in which he may have an interest. It shall b2
the duty of the commissioner of assessments and licenses to notify the enforcing agencies
of the city forthwith of all licenses revoked hereunder." 1 Pnmt & FisonHE, OPA Gin;-
ERAL Drsr Boon 6085 (1943).
47. City of Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 156, 60 N.E2d 919, 924 (1945).
48. Id. at 149, 60 N.E. 2d at 921 (italics added).
49. Cf. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387-9 (1879) where a federal law punishing
violations by state officials of their election duties under state was upheld, after being
construed as adopting the state law requirements as federal requirements.
50. Whether regarded as the exercise of a power to meet the dangers of inflation
within the city or simply a power to assist the federal government in the exercise of one
of the latter's legitimate undertakings, it may properly be classified under the police
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violations of the ordinance being municipal offenses, jurisdiction of the
local courts was, of course, proper.)5 1 In disposing of the Sell case, the
Michigan Supreme Court had no difficulty in seeing the relevancy of
the police power issue, devoting more than half of its opinion to an
analysis of the police powers of a home-rule city in a wartime emer-
gency and concluding that Detroit had ample power to pass the ordil-
nance. 52 In the Mailman case, the lower court, which was affirmed with-
out opinion by the New York Court of Appeals, assumed the pertinence
of the police-power issue by briefly considering and rejecting, at the
close of its opinion, the due process objection under the State and Fed-
eral Constitutions. And, the New York Court of Appeals also consid-
ered this objection briefly but explicitly in the Lewis case.
In their treatment of the police power issue, the Michigan court and
the lower New York court were impressed by the fact that the same
price-control requirements which were, in effect, embodied in the local
legislation were already applicable to the inhabitants of Detroit and
New York, respectively, by virtue of the fact that the federal wartime
act was the "law of the land", applicable throughout interstate and
intrastate commerce. The local prohibitions became applicable to these
inhabitants in addition to the federal prohibitions, but they imposed
no new standard of conduct; hence, they required less exertion of police
power, which includes the broad "general welfare" authority. Even if regarded as not
within the police power, a state's exercise of the power would not thereby become illegal.
For, if not restricted by express or implied limitations of the State constitution or by
paramount federal law, a state may exercise any power even though not specifically
designated in the state constitution. See 1 CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrTATIoNs 173-9
(8th ed. 1927).
51. Cf. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 314 (1926) rejecting the contention that
the exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction provided by § 256 of the Judicial Code was ap-
plicable to criminal proceedings for violation of a state liquor law similar to the Na-
tional Prohibition Act, where the conduct involved was a violation of both laws. Miller's
Executors v. Swann, 150 U.S. 132, 136 (1893): "The fact that the state statute and the
mortgage refer to certain acts of Congress as prescribing the rule and measure of the
rights granted by the State does not make the determination of such rights a Federal
question."
52. The ordinance read as follows: "Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
firm, copartnership, association or corporation, in the course of trade or business, to
wilfully and knowingly sell or in any way to transfer a commodity rationed by any order
or regulation of the United States of America, or any agency thereof, without taking in
exchange for such commodity the coupons, stamps, certificates, ration checks or other
ration documents, if any, required by the order or regulation in effect at the time of the
sale or transfer.
"Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to wilfully and knowingly sell a com-
modity which is the subject of a ceiling price fixed by or under the authority of the
United States of America at a price in excess of such ceiling price so established.
"Sec. 3. Any person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation violating any of
the provisions of this ordinance shall, upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine not
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power to enact. 3 Both courts were also influenced by the emergency
character of the local legislation. As the Michigan court obser'ed: "W11e
have repeatedly recognized that emergencies may require the enact-
ment of statutes or ordinances which might be held improper in normal
times. Therefore, this ordinance should not be judged by the same
tests as those applied to an ordinance enacted in peacetime."54 In par-
ticular, the emergency of war had a special significance for both courts.
The New York legislation was regarded as defensible in terms of a kind
of "war power" of the state.15 The Michigan court asserted the same
exceeding $500 or imprisonment in the Detroit house of correction for a period- not ex-
ceeding 90 days, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
"Sec. 4. This ordinance is hereby declared to be necessary for the preservation of
the public peace, health and safety and is hereby given immediate effect." Ord. No.
349-D of the city of Detroit, made effective Oct. 14, 1943.
53. Thus, in the midst of its discussion of the police-power of a home-rule city in
an emergency, the Michigan Court observed: "It should be noted that the ordinance did
not create new regulations and prohibitions but merely added the city's enforcement
sanction to Federal laws and regulations which were already applicable to the city and
its inhabitants during the emergency." People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 319, 17 N.AV2d
193, 197 (1945). The New York Court said: "As to section 6 of article I of the State
Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, it is again to be noted that the price regulations are fixed by
Federal legislation which has already been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Rottenberg v. United States (321 U.S. 414) and Yakits v. Unitcd States (321
U.S. 414)... . As to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which, among other things, provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, it is sufficient to repeat that the State War
Emergency Act is merely an enforcement act, since it does not and cannot change the
terms or the force and effect of the act of Congress in establishing the Office of Price
Administration, and granting powers for the fixing of price ceilings in restraint of infla-
tionary commodity prices." People v. Mailman, 182 Misc. 870, 877, 49 N.Y.S2d 733,
739 (N.Y. City Cts. 1944), aff'd uithout opinion, 293 N.Y. 887, 59 N.E.2d 790 (1944).
54. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 319, 17 N.W. 2d 193, 197 (1945).
55. "In considering the legislation establishing the State War Council and the res-
olution of the latter, adopted in pursuance thereof, it should be noted that the State has
undertaken to put itself on a war basis in support of the United States and its Allies in
the pending struggle against the Axis powers. Under our form of government the power
to declare war is lodged exclusively in the Congress of the United States. That, how-
ever, does not prevent a State from enacting legislation and taking every step in support
of national defense in time of war. That the legislation is designed as a war measure
appears from the title 'War Emergency Act'. Moreover, the War Council, by Section 5
Chapter 445 Laws of 1942, is 'created and established as a temporary state commission',
presumably to lapse upon the termination of the war. The temporary character of the
legislation as a war measure is further emphasized by its successive extensions for brief
periods of time.
"From an examination of the legislation as a whole one cannot escape the conclusion
that the State of New York is making an all-out effort to back the National Government
in its effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful termination. Consequently it
might reasonably be contended that the legislation should be sustained as a vmr measure,
predicated upon the inherent powers of the State to adopt measures not in conflict with
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idea by invoking the World War I cases upholding state sedition acts
similar to the federal sedition act-cases which pointed out that in time
of war a state may "make the national purposes its own purposes to
the extent of exerting its police power to prevent its own citizens from
obstructing the accomplishment of such purposes"" and that "this
country is one composed of many and must on occasions be animated
as one and . . . the constituted and constituting sovereignties must
have power of cooperation against the enemies of all."" Other author-
ities, too, might have been cited for the proposition."8
But, also included in the reasoning of the Michigan court is a discus-
sion of police power which is independent of the foregoing factors pecu-
liar to the wartime inflation emergency. The court points out that a
presumption of constitutionality supports the ordinance as it would a
statute; that except as limited by state constitution or statute, the
police power of Detroit as a home-rule city is the of same general na-
ture as the state's police power, and, hence, various authorities uphold-
ing the exercise of broad police power by states are applicable here;
that home-rule municipalities, under the modem cases, may exercise
their police power to safeguard "the general or public welfare in its
most comprehensive sense" and, therefore, may concern themselves
with "regulated municipal development, the security of home life, the
preservation of a favorable environment in which to rear children, the
protection of morals and health, the safeguarding of the economic struc-
ture upon which the public good depends, the stabilization of the use and
value of property, the attraction of a desirable citizenship and fostering
its permanency." 11 The limits of the power, the court believes, are
those established by the Supreme Court with respect to state police
power in Nebbia v. New York."0 "There can be no doubt that upon
proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate
a business in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for
the products or commodities it sells. . . . Price control, like any other
form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory,
those adopted by the National Government." 182 Misc. 870, 875, 49 N.Y.S.2d 733, 737
(N.Y. City Cts. 1944), aff'd without opinion, 293 N.Y. 887, 59 N.E.2d 790 (1944).
56. State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 275, 166 N.W. 181, 183 (1918).
57. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 329 (1920).
58. See State v. McClure, 30 Del. 265, 105 At. 712 (1919) ; State v. Gordon, 138
Fla. 312, 316, 189 So. 437, 439 (1939) ; State v. Kahn, 56 Mont. 108, 116, 182 Pac. 107,
108 (1919); State v. Tachin, 92 N.J.L. 269, 106 Atl. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aft'd, 93
N.J.L. 485, 108 Atl. 318 (1919), app. dismissed, 254 U.S. 662 (1920); People ex rel.
Doscher v. Sisson, 180 App. Div. 464, 468, 167 N. Y. S. 801, 804 (1917), aft'd, 222 N.Y.
387, 118 N.E. 789 (1918); Cass Township v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 38 (1864); 3 Wu.-
LOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1574-5 (2d ed. 1929).
59. 310 Mich. 305, 316, 17 N.W.2d 193, 196. The court is here quoting from its de-
cision in Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 514, 286 N.W. 805, 810 (1939).
60. 291 U.S. 502, 537-9 (1934).
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or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to
adopt.16 1 This policy of the Nebbia case, which represents a relatively
recent expansion of the state police power concept, 2 is matched by an
analogous expansion in the field of municipal police power.13
The New York Court of Appeals so recognized, when in the Leis
case, without reference to the emergency at all, it held: "The Constitu-
tion of the State (art. IX, § 12),64 the City Home Rule Law (§ 11,
61. Ibid.
62. The decision, which declared that "affected with a public interest' is the cquhva-
lent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" is a landmark in constitutional law.
There was a time when a price-control enactment wvas subjected to the special test of
whether the economic activity being regulated was "affected with a public interest" This
was the test applied, for instance, when the United States Supreme Court decided that
purported police power laws controlling the resale price of theater tickets in New York
(Tyson and Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927)) or controlling the rates charged by
employment agencies in New Jersey (Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928)) were
invalid (although even at that time Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Ribnlk v.
McBride, supra, at 360, could recite considerable authority for the proposition that regu-
lations were within the police power "whenever any combination of circumstances seri-
ously curtails the regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers are placed at
such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that a legislature might reasonably antici-
pate serious consequences to the community as a whole."). The departure made by the
Nebbia case is strikingly shown by the fact that it was relied upon in a subsequent New
York case sustaining a theater ticket law similar to that involved in the Tyson case (cf.
Kelly-Sullivan, Inc. v. Moss, 174 Misc. 1098, 22 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct 1940), off'd
without opinion, 24 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1st Dept. 1940)) and in a Supreme Court case ex-
pressly overruling the Ribnik case and upholding the Nebraska statute regulating the
fees charged by employment agencies (Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941)). The
Nebbia case was also cited, among others, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937), upholding a state minimum w%,age law for women and overruling Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
63. "It is now no longer questioned that the state may interfere directly or in-
directly by any of its agencies, including, of course, the municipal corporation, 'whenever
the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily
vested in the legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require,
but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.' Accordingly, the
police power is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace new subjects as exigencies arise
and changing conditions require. . . .
"It is certain that the recent judicial decisions incline to give a more e.'tensive scope
to the police power than the earlier cases. The general welfare is expanding rapidly. In
its application to urban life it is wide and varied. The last two generations have wit-
nessed a decided change in the views of the courts relating to the construction and prac-
tical operation of police ordinances. Greater power is freely conceded to be vested in the
public authorities. Their judgment and discretion is more respected. The public welfare
in its broadest sense has been adopted as the basis of construction. This position is sound,
and is certain to aid materially the development of better urban conditions." 3 Mc-
QurLLIN, TaE- LAW OF MlUNICIPAL CORPoRATIONs § 942, pp. 86, 88 (2d ed., Kearney 1943
revision).
64. N.Y. CoxsT. Art. IX, § 12 provides:
"§ 12. (Power of cities to enact local laws relating to property, affairs or govern-
ment.) Every city shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with
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subd. 2) 65 and the New York City Charter (§ 27) 11 have conferred
upon the City Council broad legislative power to provide by local law
for the preservation and promotion of the health, safety and general
welfare of its inhabitants. If such laws have substantial relation to
matters over which legislative power is vested in the local legislative
body of the city and are not inconsistent with laws of the State, they
are valid ...
"There can be no doubt that such a law [imposing penalties for viola-
tion of OPA regulations] is within the field of legislative power of the
city as defined in the provisions of the Constitution, the City Home
Rule Law and the New York City Charter unless it is inconsistent with
the constitution and laws of the state relating to its property, affairs or government.
Every city shall also have the power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with
this constitution and laws of the state, and whether or not such local laws relate to its
property, affairs or government, in respect to the following subjects: . the govern-
ment and regulation of the conduct of its inhabitants and the protection of their property,
safety and health."
65. N.Y. City Home Rule Law, Art. 2, § 11 provides:
"§ 11. Power of cities to adopt and amend local laws.
1. Subject to the restrictions provided in this chapter, the local legislative body of a
city shall have power to adopt and amend (a) local laws in relation to the property,
affairs or government of the city . . Such local laws may change or supersede any
provision of an act of the legislature theretofore enacted which provision does not In
terms and in effect apply alike to all cities ...
2. The local legislative body of a city shall also have power to adopt and amend local
laws in relation to . . . . the government and regulation of the conduct of its inhabi-
tants and the protection of their property, safety or health, whether such local laws re-
late to the property, affairs or government of such city or not. Such local laws, in so far
as they do not relate to the property, affairs or government of the city or to other matters
in relation to which the city is authorized by subdivision one to pass l.ocal laws, shall not
change or supersede any act of the legislature ...
3. In the exercise of such powers, the local legislative body of a city shall have
power: . . . . (b) To provide for the enforcement of local laws by legal or equitable
proceedings, to prescribe that violations thereof shall constitute misdemeanors and to pro-
vide for the punishment of violations thereof by civil penalty, fine, forfeiture or im-
prisonment, or by two or more of such punishments."
66. Sec. 27 of the New York City Charter provides: "Any enumeration of powers in
this charter shall not be held to limit the legislative power of the council except as in
this charter specifically provided. The council in addition to all enumerated powers shall
have power to adopt local laws as to it may seem meet, applicable throughout the whole
city or only to specified portions thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this charter, or with the constitution or laws of the United States or of this state, for
the good rule and government of the city; for the order, protection and government of
persons and property, for the preservation of the public health, comfort, peace and pros-
perity of the city and its inhabitants; and to effectuate the purposes and provisions of
this charter or of the other laws relating to the city. The council shall have power to
provide for the enforcement of local laws by legal or equitable proceedings, to prescribe
that violations thereof shall constitute misdemeanors and to provide for the punishment of




the laws of the State ... ." 6 That the ordinance bore a "substan-
tial relation" to the promotion of the "general welfare" was apparently
regarded by the court as almost self-evident.cs
Thus, as far as the police power issue is concerned, these cases are
useful precedents in the analysis of future peacetime attempts by state
or local sovereignties to penalize conduct violative of federal regula-
tions. (1) They show that, contrary to the Piskura dictum, such legis-
lation (though in form penalizing violation of a federal regulation) is not
to be regarded as merely adding another sanction against a federal of-
fense, but as creating a local offense-hence, making relevant the in-
quiry of whether the local requirements established fall within the
scope of one of the local sovereignty's powers e.g., police power. (2)
Where the federal power involved is of such a nature that the federal
requirements are applicable not only in interstate commerce but also
'dwthin the local jurisdiction, the consequent fact that the local require-
ments establish no new standard of conduct for inhabitants of the state
or municipality gives the exercise of local power less impact upon people
and property, and makes it more readily sustainable as a reasonable ex-
ercise of local power. (3) Where the local enactment is grounded in the
police power-and most future attempts at cooperation by "adoption"
of federal regulations will be so grounded-the Leuis decision in par-
67. People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 49-50, 64 N.E.2d 702, 703 (1945).
68. The court did indicate its feeling on the point when it observed in discussing the
issue of conflict with the state law, Id. at 51, 64 N.E.2d at 704: "The local law supple-
ments the State law by providing heavier penalties for black-market transactions in New
York City of the gravest consequence to the property, safety and health of its crowded
population, dependent upon thousands of small storekeepers from whom the daily ne-
cessities of life must be purchased. The situation justified stern enforcement to avoid
many evils and consequent hardship, or at least the local Legislature could so decide."
The local legislative judgment that combating inflation more effectively would re-
dound to the general welfare of the city's inhabitants and that a local enforcement pro-
gram was reasonably adapted to this objective, is, of course, readily defensible as a
non-arbitrary judgment. Much of the creeping increase in the cost of living while price
controls were in effect was due to the inadequate number of enforcement investigators
available to the Office of Price Administration-a number which would probably always
be inadequate, since policing of the daily transactions of 130,000,000 people in every city,
town, and hamlet of the nation cannot be accomplished with complete effectiveness by the
use of federal manpower alone. Even with an extensive and judicious use of field offices,
a law of diminishing returns in efficiency sets in, as more and more time goes into "co-
ordination", inter-regional and intra-regional reports, etc. Enforcement staffs of states
and municipalities, on the other hand, operate as a more compact unit, they are much
closer to the source of the danger, they can in many cases readily adapt existing enforce-
ment facilities to the new functions, and they can make use of local (usually swifter)
court procedures. The importance to the federal OPA program in New York City, of
the New York State War Emergency Act and War Council Resolution thereunder,
graphically appears from the testimony of Mayor LaGuardia on April 17, 1944, before
the Senate Committee considering renewal of the federal Act in 1944 (Hearings before
Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1764, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. 653-9 (1944));
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ticular, and the Sell case as well, is a reminder that the modem police
power cases make unlikely an invalidation of the legislation (on the
ground that it exceeds the legitimate scope of police power) where it
is reasonably related to a legitimate objective. And, validation becomes
the more probable when it is remembered that few examples of such
future legislation will attempt to encompass as comprehensive a field
of economic activity as the price, rent, and rationing controls involved
in the instant cases.
and more impressive still is the following tabular analysis of prosecutions under the New
York state and city legislation (obtained from the office of Chief Magistrate Brom-
berger):
Number of Cases Under N. Y. State War Emergency Act (as originally enacted and as
later incorporated into General Business Law in 1946) and Under
N. Y. City Ordinances Enacted in July, 1945
Courts 1943* 1944 1945 1946 1947 Total
(First
Quarter)
Municipal Term, Manhattan 1792 7295 - - - 9087
Other Manhattan Courts 2347 1032 14 1 - 3394
Municipal Term, Bronx 1195 3926 - - - 5121
Other Bronx Courts 587 243 23 - - 853
Municipal Term, Brooklyn 2133 6228 - - - 8361
Other Brooklyn Courts 1519 351 14 - - 1884
Queens Courts 1582 3717 3 1 - 5303
Richmond (Staten Island) Courts 211 601 - - - 812'War Emergency Court (Queens) - 1019 - - - 1019
'War Emergency Court (Manhattan,
Brooklyn and Bronx) - 4120 - - 4120
'War Emergency Court (Manhattan,
Brooklyn, Bronx and Queens) - 2374 7928 - - 10302
dWar Emergency Separate Courts:
Manhattan - - 8266 10284 48 18598
Bronx - - 3471 3433 29 6933
Brooklyn - - 6104 8930 28 15062
Queens - - 2318 2432 11 4761
Richmond (Staten Island) - - 383 313 2 698
Total 11,366 30,906 28,524 25,394 118 96,308
Violations of the War Emergency Act were first separately recorded as such commencing May
26, 1943.
aWar Emergency Court for the Borough of Queens established October 26, 1944; abolished
December 7 1944.
bc War Emergency Court for the Boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn and the Bronx established
Nov. 13, 1944; jurisdiction of Municipal Term Courts cancelled and rescinded effective at the close
of business on November 10, 1944.
c War Emergency Court for the Boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn and the Bronx enlarged to
include the Borough of Queens on December 11, 1944.
d War Emergency Court sessions ordered to be held in the separate boroughs of lM.anhattan,
Brooklyn, Bronx and Queens (April 23, 1945); Staten Island Court inaugurated a separate docket
for War Emergency cases July 30, 1945, prior to which time all such cases were recorded In the
general docket of the Central Court.
After July, 1945, the great majority of cases were brought under the ordinances
rather than the state law because they carried heavier penalties and were believed to be
more clearly free of any requirement that wilfulness be shown than was the state law.
The division of labor among the city officials was to have the Sheriff's office work on
wholesaler violations and the Department of Markets on retailer violations. The prose-
cutions were handled by the Corporation Counsel's office, often with assistance from
OPA personnel. Numerous cases under the New York legislation were handled wholly
by OPA personnel on the theory that any citizen of New York can file and prosecute a
complaint for offenses against the state or city.
